In a secure message transmission (SMT) scenario, a sender wants to send a message in a private and reliable way to a receiver. Sender and receiver are connected by n wires, t of which can be controlled by an adaptive adversary with unlimited computational resources. In Eurocrypt 2008, Garay and Ostrovsky considered an SMT scenario where sender and receiver have access to a public discussion channel and showed that secure and reliable communication is possible when n t + 1. In this paper, we will show that a secure protocol requires at least three rounds of communication and two rounds invocation of the public channel and hence give a complete answer to the open question raised by Garay and Ostrovsky. We also describe a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
D OLEV et al. [5] introduced Secure Message Transmission (SMT) systems to address the problem of delivering a message from sender to receiver in a network guaranteeing reliability and privacy. is connected to by node disjoint paths, referred to as wires, controlled by the adversary with unlimited computational power.
A perfectly secure message transmission or PSMT for short, guarantees that always receive the sent message and the adversary does not learn anything about it. It was shown that PSMT is possible if and only if . See [5] , [18] , [20] , [2] , [8] , and [14] for more references. Franklin and Wright [9] relaxed the security requirement of SMT protocols and proposed probabilistic security in which two parameters and upper bound the advantage of the adversary in breaking privacy, and the probability that fails to recover the sent message, respectively. In a PSMT protocol . In this paper, we refer to these protocols as almost SMT protocols. We refer interested readers to [7] , [13] , [1] , and [16] . Franklin and Wright [9] also considered a model where an additional reliable broadcast channel is available to and . A broadcast channel guarantees that all nodes of the network receive the same message. We refer to this model as a Broadcast Model (BM). They showed that PSMT in this model requires , but probabilistic security can be obtained with and gave a 3-round protocol in this model. Garay and Ostrovsky [11] replaced the broadcast channel with an authentic and reliable public channel that connects and . A public channel is totally susceptible to eavesdropping but is immune to tampering. We refer to this communication model as Public Discussion Model (PDM). Garay and Ostrovsky [11] gave a four-round protocol with probabilistic security when , which shows that the connectivity requirement for PDM is the same as the broadcast model.
Efficiency parameters of SMT protocols are: i) the number of rounds where each round is one message flow between and , or vice versa, and ii) the communication efficiency measured in terms of transmission rate which is the total number of bits sent over all wires for a message divided by the length of the secret.
Round complexity in PDM is measured by a pair where is the total number of rounds and is the number of rounds that the public channel is invoked . Related models: Pubic channel has been used in other contexts including unconditionally secure key agreement [15] where the public channel is used for the advantage distillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The public channel in this case is a free resource and its communication cost is not considered. In PDM however, the cost of realizing a public channel in a distributed system is taken into account (see the later discussion).
A. Our Results
Garay and Ostrovsky [11] proposed a (4,3)-round protocol and subsequently improved its round complexity to (3,2)-round [10] . However it was not known if this round complexity was optimal.
Generally, the main result of this paper is to prove that the minimum values of and for which an -round protocol can exist are 3 and 2, respectively. This answers the question of round optimality of almost SMT protocols in PDM that was raised in [11] .
Our results on round optimality are obtained in three steps. We first prove that there is no (2,2)-round protocol in PDM with when , where denotes the 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE (2, 2) -round complexity will be either unreliable, or insecure.
In the second step we will show that when the invocation of the public channel does not depend on the protocol execution and is statically determined as part of protocol description, there is no -round protocol with and when . Then we generalize this result to the case that the invoker of the public channel is not fixed at the start of the protocol and is adaptively determined in each execution, and show that there is no (3,1)-round protocol with . We also construct a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel when the binary length (say ) of the message is . An extended abstract of this work has been presented in [19] . Based on our published results, Garay et al. [12] have shown some improvements most recently. Especially, they constructed a (3,2)-round SMT-PD protocol with sublinear communication complexity on the public channel and optimal communication complexity over wires (as proved in [12] ), and thus surpasses our protocol in communication efficiency. Table I summarizes our results and puts them in relation to others' works.
B. Discussion
One of the main motivations for studying SMT has been to reduce connectivity requirement in multiparty computation (MPC) protocols [3] , [4] , [17] . MPC protocols assume a secure and reliable channel (link) between every two parties. That is the network graph with nodes corresponding to the players and edges corresponding to secure and reliable channels (links) between two nodes, is a complete graph. If the network is incomplete, each node has a set of neighbors and two nodes that are not neighbors may be connected by paths consisting of multiple edges. A path is secure if all nodes on the path are secure. Using an SMT protocol one can simulate a secure channel between two nodes as long as there are sufficient number of secure paths between the two nodes. Assuming a public discussion channel, it reduces the required number of secure paths to . That is, assuming a public discussion channel, secure communication between two nodes can exist as long as there is a single secure path between them 1 .
Public discussion channels may not exist in the network. One however can simulate the channel using other protocols in some scenarios. For example, [11] showed how to simulate a public discussion channel using almost everywhere broadcast protocol which in turn uses almost everywhere Byzantine agreement [6] , [21] . Such simulations may however be expensive. For example in [21] it is shown that in degree-bounded networks agreement on a single bit using almost-everywhere agreement protocol requires at least communication rounds, where is the number of nodes in the network.
We note that in the synchronous model of MPC, in each round, a player may send a message to each of its neighbors (one each of its adjacent link), and all messages in a round are delivered before the start of the next round. In the study of SMT [11] , [13] , [2] , [9] , [5] , the terms 'phase' and 'have' round interchangeably been used to refer to the sending and receiving of messages as defined above, but over paths. Thus we use the term synchronous "round" to refer to sending and receiving messages over paths that may consist of multiple links. This is also in accordance with the usage of this term in the context of SMT-PD in [11] that introduced this model.
C. Organization
Section 2 describes the security model and relevant definitions. Lower bounds on round complexity of SMT-PD protocol are proved in Section III. Section IV describes an round optimal -SMT by public discussion protocol. Finally, we draw a conclusion in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Model and Notations
Network model. We assume that a pair of players and in a synchronous network are connected by wires and an authentic and reliable public channel. Messages over the public channel are publicly accessible and are correctly delivered to the recipient. All wires and the public channel are bidirectional. SMT protocols proceed in rounds. In each round, one player may send a message on each wire and the public channel, while the other player will only receive the sent messages. The sent messages will be delivered before the next round starts. Adversary model. We assume a computationally unbounded adversary who can corrupt up to wires. can fully control the corrupted wires and eavesdrop, modify or block messages sent over them. We assume is adaptive and can corrupt wires any time during the protocol execution and after observing communications over the wires that she has corrupted so far.
To prove Theorems 2, 3, and 4, however, we assume the adversary is static and chooses the corrupted wires before the start of the protocol. The lower bound on round complexity of such an adversary will obviously hold for more powerful adaptive adversaries. (Note that a static adversary may act adaptively during the protocol execution with regard to messages that are sent over the corrupted wires: in each round, the adversary sees the traffic over all the corrupted wires and the public channel before tampering the traffic over the corrupted wires in that round.) Notations. Let be the message space. Let denote the secret message of , and the message output by . We use to denote null string and to denote empty set. The notation denotes that a value is sampled uniformly from a set .
B. Definitions
The statistical distance of two random variables over a set is given by (1) Lemma 1: [22] Let be two random variables over a set . The advantage of any computationally unbounded algorithm to distinguish from is
In an execution of an SMT protocol wants to send to privately and reliably. We assume that at the end of the protocol, always outputs a message . An execution is completely determined by the random coins of all the players including the adversary, and the message distribution of . For , the view of includes the random coins of and the messages that receives. Denote by the view of when the protocol is run with and 's randomness .
Definition 1:
A protocol between and is an -(SMT-PD) protocol if for any message distribution the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied.
• Privacy: For every two messages and , it has where the probability is taken over the randomness of and .
• Reliability: recovers the message with probability larger than , or formally where the probability is over the randomness of players and , and the choice of .
III. ROUND COMPLEXITY OF SMT-PD PROTOCOL
By the similarity of broadcast model and public discussion model, we recall Franklin and Wright's results [9] in our language as follows.
Theorem 1: [9] If
, then: (i) For any values , it is impossible to construct -round -SMT-PD protocols; (ii) For any values and , it is impossible to construct -round -SMT-PD protocols with . In this section, we will prove when any -SMT-PD protocol needs (3, 2)-round complexity. This is by proving that: i) secure (2,2)-round -SMT-PD protocols do not exist and ii) for any (3, 1)-round protocol, either privacy or reliability can be compromised.
The following lemma plays a central role in proving the impossibility results in this paper. Loosely speaking, the lemma shows that for an -SMT-PD protocol no algorithm that is given the adversary's view as the input, can output with a probability much better than random guess.
Lemma 2:
Let be an -SMT-PD protocol and assume selects . Then no adversary can correctly guess with probability larger than . That is where denotes the adversary's output, and the probability is taken over the random coins of and . In proving Lemma 2, we need the Lemma 3 below (See Appendix A for its proof).
Lemma 3: Consider an
-SMT-PD protocol and an adversary that plays the following game: the challenger sets up the system; selects two messages from and gives them to a challenger who selects and runs the protocol (by simulating ) to transmit . can corrupt up to wires and finally outputs a bit .
Let be the output of when is selected by in the simulation. Then (2) where the probability is taken over the randomness of and .
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is by contradiction: assume that there is an adversary that can output with probability . We will construct an algorithm to invalidate (2) . The code of is as follows: chooses two messages and asks the challenger to transmit one of the two messages. chooses a bit and simulates to run protocol in transmitting . runs adversary as a subroutine to attack the protocol. answers 's queries by forwarding them to the challenger and returning the results back to . At the end of the protocol outputs a message in (which can be different from and ). outputs 1 if outputs , and outputs 0, otherwise. Note that will have the complete view of . Then
Note that (3) follows by that fact that is chosen independent of and the randomness of players and in the simulation of and so the probability of 's output to be equal to (which is chosen randomly) is at most the probability of random guess which is . Hence, we have contradicting Corollary 3.
A. Impossibility of (2,2)-Round -SMT-PD Protocol When
The impossibility proof needs to analyze the actions of the adversary in rounds, hence we start by decomposing an SMT-PD protocol into rounds as follows.
Definition 2: For a -round SMT-PD protocol, the functionality of the protocol is described as a sequence of randomized functions . The function denotes the that is used to generate the traffic sent in the -th round. The input of consists of the received messages of previous rounds and random coins of the caller. For a player denotes the random coins of , and denotes the set of all messages received by during the first rounds with and . If the initiator of round is , we write to denote the random variable corresponding to traffic in round ; here denotes the traffic over the public channel, and and denote the traffic over the corrupted wires and the uncorrupted wires, respectively, or vice versa.
The function denotes the . By the end of the protocol, outputs .
Theorem 2: Let . Then there is no (2,2)-round -SMT-PD protocol with . The proof is by contradiction: suppose there exists a (2,2)round -SMT-PD protocol with . We construct an adversary that breaks the privacy of by impersonating . We show that for each execution of where sends a message to , there exists a second execution called swapped execution where sends the message but impersonates such that receives identical traffic in the two executions and so cannot distinguish the two. The views of and are however swapped in the two executions, and so if outputs in one of the executions, then outputs in the swapped execution and so . Using Lemma 2 and that is an -SMT-PD protocol, we have which is a contradiction. Proof: Assume by contradiction that there is a (2,2)-round -SMT-PD protocol with , and the message distribution over is uniform. Suppose wires are labeled by , and . (Note if there exists an -SMT-PD protocol for , the same protocol can be run for by neglecting the last wires. Thus an impossibility result for still holds for .) As mentioned in the adversarial model (Section II), the adversary is assumed to be static in the following proof.
We write 's randomness as , where is used to select one of the two sets of wires: or for corruption and is used for encoding and decoding of the traffic. Let and denote the first and the last sets of wires will be corrupted, respectively.
Before going ahead, we remark that: i) the last round message of a SMT-PD protocol can only be from to as otherwise it can be removed without affecting the output of and ii) for generality, we do not assume the interaction in a SMT-PD protocol should be back-and-forth, meaning that some consecutive rounds of the protocol may have the same sender and cannot be combined into one round. Under the effect of public channel, this provides a possible paradigm in designing SMT-PD protocols. E.g., both of the first two rounds of the protocol in [11] are from to , and are from to in [10] .
Therefore, depending on the order of the first round, a 2-round SMT-PD protocol has two kinds of interactions. CASE 1. In this case, the first round traffic is from to , while the second round is from to . Assume , i.e., the last wires are corrupted. We illustrate the strategy of in Fig. 1 and formalize it as follows.
• Round 1: When sends computes where is the value computed from and results in over the public channel, hence can leave the transmission over the public channel unchanged. This is always possible because the function table of is public and is computationally unbounded. Thus can find the set of random strings such that and selects . will then replaces by . • Round 2: When generates message blocks the transmission over the corrupted wires and outputs . Let be the set of all executions of in presence of . We consider a binary relation over such that if: i) are the same in the two executions; ii) ; and iii)
, where '' in the superscript denotes the random coins used and messages output by and in , respectively. Note that in the two executions, the corrupted wires are swapped with the uncorrupted ones such that For a pair of , the first round messages received by in and are identical and equal to . Thus, in the second round, will generate the same traffic in both and , and so if outputs in will output in since . Let be the probability that execution is running. Similarly define . Denote by the set of executions with and so we have . Now holds in if holds in and so we have . Observe that is completely determined by the probability of selecting and other random coins of all the players. For any two executions , we note that , while and are both selected with uniform probability. Moreover, when and are fixed, both of the probability of selecting and are . We thus get . Then by Lemma 2 and above argument (4) Therefore, it has , which contradicts the assumption on . CASE 2. In this case, both of the two rounds traffic are from to . Intuitively, if and receives no feedback from can just block the traffic over the corrupted wires such that has no advantage over in recovering . More specifically, considering two executions and in this case, where the random coins of and are swapped, and the corrupted and uncorrupted wires are also swapped. If blocks the corrupted wires, the view of in will equal the view of in . Then if outputs in one execution, will output it in the swapped execution. By Lemma 2 and the assumption on , (4) holds also in this case, thus it follows that .
B. Impossibility of -Round -SMT-PD Protocol When
Theorem 2 shows that optimal -SMT-PD protocols need at least 3 rounds, while Theorem 1 shows that at least one round public channel invocation is necessary. A natural question thus is to find out if secure -round SMT-PD protocols can exist. As a warm-up, the following theorem gives a negative answer to the case that the invoker of public channel is specified initially in the protocol.
Theorem 3: Let and . Then a -round -SMT-PD protocol with fixed invoker of public channel has either or . The proof is by contradiction: assume there exists a -round -SMT-PD protocol with fixed public channel invoker, where values of and do not satisfy any of the above inequalities. We construct an adversary who can break either the privacy or the reliability of . 's strategy is to block the traffic (over the corrupted channels) sent by the invoker of public channel, and to replace the traffic (over the corrupted wires) sent to the invoker by forged traffic that is constructed according to the protocol description. Then:
1) If the public channel is invoked by , we will show that cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which she has the same views. The two executions have the property that if outputs in one execution then outputs in the swapped execution. Using an argument similar to Theorem 2 we prove that the adversary can break the privacy of the protocol and thus obtain . 2) If the public channel is invoked by , we will show that cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which he has the same views. If in one execution outputs , he will output in the swapped execution with the same probability. The two executions have the same probability and so when , we prove the adversary can break the reliability of the protocol and so obtain . Proof: We stress that in this proof the invoker of the public channel is already specified in the protocol, whereas the actual invocation round of the public channel can be adaptive to the protocol execution. The impossibility result will hold straightforwardly for the case that the invocation round of the public channel is a part of the protocol specification.
As noted in the Proof of Theorem 2, the interaction order in the protocol is not necessarily back-and-forth, and the last round is from to . Moreover, we also suppose the message distribution over is uniform, and and the adversary is static.
We separate the randomness (of ) into four parts: , where is used to choose one of the two subsets of wires to corrupt ( and are used for the first or the last wires, respectively), is used to generate traffic for substituting the message sent by for generating traffic to substitute the message sent by , and denotes the randomness of uniformly selecting a message from to impersonate 's traffic. CASE 1. [ invokes the public channel.] We show that in this case will break the privacy of . Without loss of generality, assume . We describe the action of as follows: in round : • when sends or blocks ; • when sends computes , then replaces by . (Here denotes the messages eavesdropped by during the first rounds.) Finally, outputs . The above strategy of is also shown in Fig. 3 . Note that can block and forge messages as above since can randomly select to generate messages , and make them consistent with the requirement of protocol . Also note that and since needs not to impersonate in this case.
Let be the set of executions of . We define a binary relation over to specify two executions and as follows: if: i) are the same for both executions; ii)
; and iii) and . Claim 1: i) The view of in is the same as her view in and ii) the view of in is identical to the view of in . Thus, the output of in is the same as the output of in . That is, holds.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume in execution we have and the public channel is used in round . Also, assume during the first rounds, is the initiator of rounds , ordered nondecreasingly. We first prove statements i) and ii) hold during the first rounds, then using the same technique we will prove the statements hold in the later rounds and thus prove . The proof is by induction over . When , the statements i) and ii) hold trivially from the facts that doesn't receive messages in the first rounds and . For each , suppose that the statements (i) and (ii) hold in the first rounds for . The induction hypothesis states that and are swapped, while are the same in executions and . Our objective is to prove that the statements i) and ii) also hold during the first rounds for . Note that in all those rounds for , transmissions are only from to . Formally, the message of each round is , and and will receive and respectively. Thus, and . As , it follows that and are swapped in and . Let be the messages received by in round of . Then will receive the same messages in round of because , and then and are exchanged in and . Thus, the statements i) and ii) hold during the first rounds. Henceforth, will send in each later round for . Observe that in these rounds will not receive messages from . Thus if invokes the public channel in round of , it will do the same in . And it follows that the view of and in and are swapped during the first rounds. A similar argument shows that after the -th round will receive identical messages in the two swapped executions. Finally, the views of in the two executions will be the same, but and are swapped in and . At the end of the protocol, we have , where denotes the messages eavesdropped by in execution .
Let
be the set of all successful executions in which outputs , and denotes the probability of execution determined by the random coins of all players. Define similarly. Then . By Claim 1, if will output in the swapped execution of ; therefore . Additionally, by the definition of and the observation of in this case, we have (5) where denote the length of the random coins of used by , and , respectively. Now by (5) , and Lemma 2, it follows that (4) also holds in this case, then it yields that , contradicting the assumption on . CASE 2. [ invokes the public channel.] We will show that in this case the reliability of will be broken. This is by showing that for every successful execution there exists an unsuccessful one and so probability of success is at most . Formally, the strategy of is similar to CASE 1, that is when , then in each round : • when sends or blocks ; • when sends computes and replaces by . (Here denotes the messages selected and eavesdropped by during the first rounds.) Note that in this case. For simplicity, we abuse the notation here to denote the uniformly selected message of using coins . Let and be as defined in CASE 1 and consider a binary relation over where if: i) is the same in the two executions; ii) ; and iii) ; iv) and . Denote by the set of successful executions in which outputs under the condition that . Claim 2: For each swapped execution pair , the views of in and are identical and so if is a successful execution, then is a failed execution. Proof: Without loss of generality, assume invokes the public channel in round of , and during the first rounds is the initiator of rounds (ordered in nondecreasing order) in execution . By induction on , we can prove that will receive the same messages during the first rounds of the two swapped executions. This means that will invoke the public channel in the same round of and , both. Furthermore, we can prove will receive the same messages during the later rounds of the two executions. Thus, we have , where denotes all messages that received in . The proof is similar to Claim 1. Now because and are swapped in and , if outputs in , he will output in . Thus for any two swapped executions when , we have .
Claim 3: i) The occur probability of any two swapped executions is the same; that is and ii) when , the failure probability of in recovering the secret message is not less than the success probability of ; formally where the probability is taken over the random coins and messages selected by and . Proof: i) Note that an execution is completely determined by the random coins and messages selected by all the players. Then for each , we have where and denote the length of the random coins of and , respectively. Similarly, we have . As in this case, it has , where denote, respectively, the length of . Similarly, it has . Note that and . By the definition of , we have that and . Hence, it has , and then holds. ii) Let denote the set of failed executions. Since holds for any , and the one-to-one correspondence of and , we get that . The probability that fails when can be computed as
From Claim 3 we must have ; hence
On the other hand, since is a reliable protocol, we have . It follows that , which contradicts the assumption on .
C. Impossibility of (3, 1)-Round PD-Adaptive -SMT-PD Protocol
Theorem 3 says when the invoker of public channel is known at the start of the protocol, then -round SMT-PD protocol is impossible. In this section we consider protocols that allow the invoker of public channel depends on the executions; or more precisely depends on the random coins of players. We call this type of SMT-PD protocols PD-adaptive.
Definition 3: A -round SMT-PD protocol is called -
if the invoker of the public channel and the round of invocation of the public channel are not specified at the start but depend on and . More specifically, for each round , let player be the initiator of the round. Let be the set of all messages received by during the first rounds and that and . We denote by the traffic of round , where denotes the traffic over the public channel, and and are the traffic over the two sets of wires, one all corrupted and one all uncorrupted.
Traffic on the public channel, that is or is determined by and . Moreover, it must have if the public channel has been used times before round .
Theorem 4: Let
. Then a PD-adaptive (3, 1)-round -SMT-PD protocol must have Proof: Suppose is an arbitrarily PD-adaptive (3, 1)-round -SMT-PD protocol. We construct a static adversary that breaks privacy or reliability of and so prove that should hold for any . The message distribution is assumed to be uniform in this proof.
selects the first or last wires to corrupt. In the rounds before invocation of the public channel, conducts man-in-themiddle attack between and by tampering with the corrupted wires. When player uses public channel, simply blocks the corrupted wires and continues to cheat by tampering the later transmissions (from the other player to ) over the corrupted wires until the end of the protocol.
Observe that despite will learn the locations of corrupted channels, but since the public channel has been used, cannot notify . Thus can continue to cheat in the later execution of the protocol. We will prove that can conduct the above attack and thus violate the privacy or reliability of the protocol.
We use to indicate the initiators of the first, second and third rounds are and , respectively. The proof is divided into four steps stated as lemmas, each proving an impossibility result for an interaction order. The omitted proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4:
If the interaction order of protocol is , then
. Proof: The invoker of public channel in this case must be and so only blocks the traffic over the corrupted wires. This is an special case of Theorem 2 and we have .
Lemma 5: If the interaction order of protocol is , then .
Lemma 6: If the interaction order of protocol is , then .
Lemma 7: If the interaction order of protocol is , then . The above argument shows that a protocol with order may have better security than protocols with other interaction orders. However, even in this case, the protocol cannot guarantee privacy and reliability at the same time. This completes the proof.
IV. AN ROUND OPTIMAL SMT-PD PROTOCOL
In this section we describe a (3,2)-round -SMT-PD protocol with constant transmission rate over the public channel, and transmission rate over the wires (when the message is long enough). This reduces the communication complexity of protocols in [9] , [10] , especially the complexity over the public channel, while we note that our result has recently been improved by [12] for a lower communication complexity.
A. Our Construction
The proposed protocol uses universal hash functions. Wegman and Carter [23] constructed a -almost strongly universal hash family . Functions in can be described by bits and computed in polynomial time. The short description length of the family allows us to authenticate messages with low communication complexity. The protocol transmits to is described in Fig. 4 .
Theorem 5: The protocol is a (3,2)-round -SMT-PD protocol. Moreover, is polynomial time computable, and its transmission rate is over the wires and constant over the public channel when , where is the reliability parameter of the system with . Proof: Let , and .
• Reliability: If can detect all corrupted wires with , the protocol is thus perfectly reliable; otherwise, one such a wire will break the reliability. Using Corollary 2, we show this probability is small. A more formal proof follows. In the second round, the wires with are detected as corrupted, and are ignored in the third round. Hence in the following we only consider wires with . For wire , the wire is called bad if but . Bad wires are always included in . Using Corollary 1 and noting that are fixed before the second round and then is selected with uniform distribution, we have where the probability is over the random coins of all the players. Then, the probability of unreliable message transmission is where the probability is over the random coins of all the players.
• Perfect Privacy: The intuition for proving perfect privacy is as follows: the adversary can obtain transmissions related to only from the public channel in round 3. However, is masked by (if wire is uncorrupted), and the adversary knows nothing about because the only transmission which depends on is in the second round invocation of public channel which is masked by and is not known by the adversary. This is true because was only transmitted on a secure wire . A more formal proof follows.
Let
be the message chosen by and denotes the value of 's coin. We first describe 's view in the protocol. Observe that in protocol is formed completely in the first round since the last two rounds are only over the public channel. Then in the first round sees over the corrupted wires and modifies them into . In the second and third round, sees respectively and over the public channel. Since is computed by using and (in adaptive way), and when knows and , she can compute and by herself, we thus remove the computable part from her view and describe it as a 4-tuple of random variables as follows:
where is 's view in round . For two messages and , the statistical distance between and is given by where the probability is over the choices of and . Then the term is given by Note that and are independent and have length and respectively, where is the Hamming weight of the string and is the description length of function in . Hence, ; note this value is independent of the value of . Therefore we only need to count the number of executions in which the coin tosses of the sender and the receiver are such that random variable . Suppose that is fixed, it implies that and are also determined; then the choices of should be consistent with and . Since , when are fixed, at most elements in can be selected freely. Moreover, when and are fixed, are also determined. Therefore, the number of result in are bounded by the number of for . Totally, they have different choices. Hence, we have The proof is complete by noting that the above probability is independent of .
• Complexity: Since the hash function is polynomial time computable in , the computation complexity of and are polynomial in and . For communication complexity, needs to communicate bits over each wire, and at most bits over the public channel, where . If the reliability requirement is set to , then . The transmission rate over the public channel assuming , is which is constant asymptotically. [9] , [10] , [12] As noted earlier, communication over public channel is much more costly than communication over wires, and so minimizing the transmission rate over the public channel will have a large effect on overall efficiency of the protocol. This is particularly important for transmitting long messages. For example in most cases provides sufficient reliability. However messages can be as long as bits. When wires are available, our proposed protocol transmits around bits over the public channel with reliability higher than (since ). The protocols in [9] , [10] both have transmission rate and so need to send almost 30 times data ( bits) over the public channel. The reliability is in [9] , [10] , which would be unnecessarily high. On the other hand, the protocol in [12] only needs to transmit about bits over the public channel with a sufficiently small unreliability parameter, and thus is the most efficient SMT-PD protocol until now.
B. Comparisons With Schemes in
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this work, we considered round optimality protocols for SMT by public discussion. This is an important communication model in realizing almost-everywhere multiparty computation. Since the implementation cost of public channel is high, it is important to minimize transmission over the pubic channel. Our results show that secure protocols in this model need at least three rounds, and in two of them, the public channel must be invoked. We prove this result in a general setting where the invocation of public channel is not known at the start of the protocol and depends on the coin tosses of participants. We describe a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel and linear transmission rate over other wires.
Existence of PD-adaptive SMT-PD protocols with rounds and one round public discussion and construction of round optimal protocols with optimal communication complexity over public channel are interesting open problems.
APPENDIX A PROOF FOR LEMMA 3
By Definition 1 and Lemma 1 we have: For any algorithm , any two messages , and any adversary with randomness (6) where the probability is over the random coins of and . Note here is (the random variable of) the view of when the (fixed) message is transmitted and uses the (fixed) coins in the protocol. Then by taking average over the randomness of , the following holds from (6) (7) where denotes the view of when the fixed message is transmitted in the protocol, and it is a random variable over the random coins of and . The adversary's strategy consists of: selecting messages followed by attacking the protocol and so we write . We use to denote the random coins used by to select . Let and . We have The last step follows from the observation that due to (7) .
APPENDIX B PROOFS OMITTED FROM THEOREM 4
As in the Proof of Theorem 3, we separate 's random coins into four parts:
. For the sake of clarity, the message selected by using randomness is denoted by , while the message outputted by by the end of the protocol is denoted by .
A. Proof of Lemma 5
The public channel can be used in any of the three rounds. For simplicity, we assume , i.e., selects the last wires to corrupt. The actions of is illustrated as in Figs. 6, 7 and 8 respectively. (We remark that when 's action is similar.) The detail of selecting when does not use the public channel in the first round is supplied in Fig. 5 . We remark that: i) When doesn't use public channel in round 1 and , the strategy as described in Fig. 5 ensures that can produce message without public channel communication in the second round. ii) Since is computationally unbounded, she knows and 's function tables and so knows the sets and . Thus, can conduct the above attacks. We analyze the success probability of in the following. Let and denote the events that invokes the public channel in round 1 and 3, respectively. Let be the event that invokes the public channel in round 2. Then , and are disjoint events and since is a (3,1)-round protocol. Obviously, it has as . The following is to prove . Since , this is equivalent to proving (8) where denotes the event that , and denotes the event that . Note that is uniformly selected by and is selected by in the first round without seeing any information about . Hence and are independent. Similarly, and are independent. Then (8) can be expressed as Let ; where comes from and . Since is uniformly selected from , we have . Furthermore, when occurs, from the definition of we have that is in , which implies . Similarly, we get
We thus prove the equality of (8), which implies that , and then Claim 5: . Proof: Denote by the set of all executions where occurs. Let denote the set of executions in which outputs given that . We define a relation such that if: i) remains unchanged in the two executions; ii) ; iii) ; and (iv) . Then cannot distinguish two swapped executions in and if , we have . Moreover, for any , a proof similar to case ii) in Claim 4 can be used to prove that . We thus have From Claim 4 and 5, we have (9)
Moreover, we also have , as otherwise by choosing to be , we have , which contradicts Lemma 2. Hence, it has By noting that and , thus .
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Assume , we illustrate 's strategy as follows. Round 1: i) If uses public channel, just blocks the corrupted wires. Then selects , and sets . ii) Otherwise, assume sends out . Consider the following two sets:
Obviously, . Then if selects ; otherwise, selects . also chooses , then computes and replaces by .
Round 2: i) If uses public channel in this round or public channel has been used in round 1, just blocks the corrupted wires. ii) Otherwise, suppose responses , it has , then the selection of ensures that can produce message without public channel communication. thus replaces by . Round 3: i) If sends out just blocks , and computes . ii) Otherwise, assume sends out , it implies that public channel has been used in the first two rounds, thus computes and replaces by . Then by a similar calculation of (9) and (10), we get where denote the events that uses the public channel in round 1 and 2 respectively, and denotes the event that uses the public channel in round 3. Finally we obtain .
C. Proof of Lemma 7
's strategy with is described as follows. Round 1: i) If uses public channel, just blocks the corrupted wires. ii) Otherwise, assume sends out selects from the set of and computes , then replaces by . In the latter two rounds. i) If does not use the public channel in round 1, it says will be the invoker of public channel, thus just blocks the corrupted wires. ii) Otherwise, chooses and computes and , then modifies the corrupted wires. We note that the impossibility proof in this scenario is similar to Lemma 5, and thus omit it here.
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